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IMMACULATE DEFAMATION:  THE CASE OF
THE ALTON TELEGRAPH
By: Alan M. Weinberger*
ABSTRACT
At the confluence of three major rivers, Madison County, Illinois, was also
the intersection of the nation’s struggle for a free press and the right of access
to appellate review in the historic case of the Alton Telegraph. The newspaper,
which helps perpetuate the memory of Elijah Lovejoy, the first martyr to the
cause of a free press, found itself on the losing side of the largest judgment for
defamation in U.S. history as a result of a story that was never published in the
paper—a case of immaculate defamation. Because it could not afford to post
an appeal bond of that magnitude, one of the oldest family-owned newspapers
in the country was forced to file for bankruptcy to protect its viability as a
going concern.
Attention must be paid to a case in which plaintiff’s counsel earns a place in
the Guinness Book of World Records and his adversary is honored for dis-
tinction in the defense of a free press and the people’s right to know. Notwith-
standing subsequent reform of the supersedeas bond process, the inability to
appeal a defamation award for lack of sufficient resources to secure a bond
still presents an existential threat to all but the largest media companies. The
appeal bond process thus has a chilling effect on organizations engaged in
newsgathering and dissemination, abridging freedoms protected by the First
Amendment. This Article proposes a re-imagination of the appeal bond to
accommodate the legitimate interests of the judgment creditor while protecting
a media defendant’s constitutional right to appeal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At about the midpoint of its journey, the mighty Mississippi River
turns almost due east for a distance of fifteen miles before reaching
Alton, Illinois, where it joins forces with the Missouri River and re-
sumes its proper course south to the Gulf of Mexico.1  The River
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. A.B. 1972, J.D. 1975,
University of Michigan.
1. The Mississippi River flows 2,350 feet through America’s heartland from its
headwaters in the north central Minnesota wilderness. Mississippi River Facts, NAT’L
PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/miss/riverfacts.htm (last visited July 27, 2013). Its
source, an antler-shaped glacial lake, was discovered in 1832 by Henry R. Schoolcraft,
who named it Lake Itasca, derived by combining two Latin words, veritas (true) and
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Bend is the brand used by Alton and neighboring communities at the
southwestern edge of Illinois to market the region for its natural
beauty as a tourist destination.2  It is an apt metaphor for the rule of
law in the jurisdiction where these river towns are located. The
Madison County judicial system has long been regarded as “bent.”3
capita (head). ANN MCCARTHY, THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER xvi (1984). It is unclear
whether Schoolcraft knew that the lake already had an Ojibwa name, Omashkoozo-
zaaga’igan (Elk Lake). The river’s name is a combination of the Ojibwa words misi
(big) and sipi (river). JOHN MADSON, UP ON THE RIVER 21 (1985).
2. The River Bend begins at the confluence of the Mississippi and Illinois Rivers
in Grafton, Illinois. The Metro East is the formal name for the portion of the St. Louis
Metropolitan Statistical Area consisting of the eastern suburbs of St. Louis situated
across the Mississippi River. The Metro East is the second-largest urban area in Illi-
nois after the Chicago metropolitan area. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS
DATA, available at http://www.census.gov/2010census/.
3. A jurisdiction’s lawsuit climate is a significant factor in business owners’
growth and expansion plans. According to Metro East’s legal journal, “The reputation
we’ve acquired nationally is a black cloud that hangs over all of us.”  Editorial, Don
Weber Wants to Change the Courthouse Climate in Madison County, MADISON-ST.
CLAIR REC. (Jan. 28, 2012), http://madisonrecord.com/arguments/241298-don-weber-
wants-to-change-the-courthouse-climate-in-madison-county. Based upon a survey of
lawyers who represent major employers, the American Tort Reform Association cur-
rently ranks Madison County as the third-most unfair litigation environment in the
nation, a slight improvement from its ranking prior to 2005 as the very worst jurisdic-
tion. Judicial Hellholes, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.judicial
hellholes.org/2012-13/Madison-county-illinois/. A national survey of lawyers by the
U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform recently named Madison County as the
sixth-most unfair and unreasonable jurisdiction in the country. Inst. for Legal Reform,
Illinois Lawsuit Climate Ranks Among Nation’s Worst, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Sept.
10, 2012), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/states/illinois. Madison County’s
class action filing rate per capita is about twenty times the national average. Noam
Neusner, The Judges of Madison County, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 17, 2001,
at 39. Former judge and state’s attorney Donald W. Weber explained why Madison
County has been such a popular venue for personal injury suits. “Attorneys will do
whatever they can to have their cases tried here. [It has] a big pool of laborers, with
all the steel companies, barge lines, and railroads that come through here. So the
juries are much more likely to be sympathetic to the plaintiff than the big companies.”
Stewart McBride, Is It Libel if It’s Never Printed?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 25,
1981), http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0625/062563.html. Although their exposure
and treatment occurred elsewhere, non-residents have historically filed a dispropor-
tionately large percentage of asbestos-related personal injury claims in Madison
County, attracted by the reputation of its juries for being generous to working-class
plaintiffs. See generally Victor E. Schwartz et al., Asbestos Litigation in Madison
County, Illinois: The Challenge Ahead, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 235 (2004). Not
unlike Delaware, where corporation franchise taxes are an important part of the state
budget, filing fees generated by asbestos lawsuits represent a significant source of
income for Madison County government. A recent audit of county finances reported
an increase in revenue attributable primarily to court filing fees, noting that 1,563
asbestos lawsuits were filed in 2012, compared with 952 in 2011. Sanford J. Schmidt,
Audit Finds Madison County Finances Strong, TELEGRAPH (Jul. 11, 2013), http://www.
thetelegraph.com/news/local/article_8fbd101c-e9b8-11e2-95b8-0019bb30f31a.html.
Members of the Madison County plaintiffs’ bar are actively involved in the highly
politicized process by which judges are selected. Circuit Court Judge Barbara
Crowder, who formerly oversaw Madison County’s asbestos docket, was recently re-
assigned when it was disclosed that she had granted 82% of 2013 trial slots to the
firms of plaintiffs’ lawyers who had made $30,000 in contributions to her re-election
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The Alton Telegraph has been the principal source of local news for
residents of the River Bend since its founding in 1836.4  Following a
jury trial in 1980, the paper found itself on the wrong side of the larg-
est damage award in the history of U.S. libel law.5  What makes the
Telegraph Case extraordinary, and one of immaculate defamation, is
that the libel was based upon a story that was never published in the
paper.
On appeal, the Telegraph Case would have presented important is-
sues of reporters’ privilege and the rights of citizens to report possible
criminal activity to law enforcement officials. Major newspapers and
journalism societies raised these issues in amicus briefs in support of
the Telegraph.6  A pattern of rulings by the trial judge against the Tel-
egraph on matters of law and evidence might well have been held to
constitute prejudicial error.
What makes the Telegraph Case tragic is that the trial court decision
was never made subject to appellate review. A jury would have the
last word after deliberating only five hours following a trial that lasted
more than five weeks. The enormity of the judgment against the Tele-
graph dwarfed its net worth. The paper could not afford to post the
bond, known as a supersedeas bond,7 necessary to file an appeal.8
campaign just days before. Stephanie Francis Ward, Illinois Judge Removed from As-
bestos Docket over Campaign Contributions, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/ill_judge_removed_from_asbestos_docket_due_to_cam-
paign_contributions/. Record-breaking jury awards have been blamed for the high
malpractice insurance premiums that have resulted in an exodus of physicians from
Madison County. Christi Parsons, Verdicts Belie Image in Madison County, CHI. TRIB.
(Jan. 9, 2005), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-01-09/news/0501090
493_1_settlement-and-verdict-payments-jury-verdict-research-circuit-court-clerk.
4. The slogan, “Serving the River Bend since 1836,” appears directly below the
name of the paper on the front page. The Telegraph, http://www.thetelegraph.com/
(last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
5. Although there have since been larger libel judgments against newspapers, the
$9.2 million award against the Telegraph is the equivalent of $25 million adjusted to
constant dollars, placing it among the largest libel verdicts awarded in U.S. history.
2012 Report on Trials and Damages, MEDIA L. RES. CTR., http://www.medialaw.org/
publications/frequently-requested (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
6. STEPHEN A. COUSLEY, SAVING THE ALTON TELEGRAPH 11 (1981). The Ap-
pellate Court of Illinois did not permit them to be filed. See infra note 139 and accom-
panying text.
7. The supersedeas bond has been a little-known feature of appellate practice
since colonial times. ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 95–99
(1941). Following a successful trial verdict, plaintiff becomes a judgment creditor of
the defendant, entitled to satisfy the judgment by seeking to execute against defen-
dant’s assets. H. Thomas Watson et al., Judgment Enforcement Issues for Appellate
Lawyers (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.lacba.org/Files/Main%20Folder/Areas%20of%20
Practice/AppellateCourts/Files/Judgment_Enforcement_Issues_for_Appellate_Law-
yers_2_13_13_Outline.pdf. By placing the assets of a bonding company behind the
obligation, an appeal bond ensures that money to satisfy the judgment will be availa-
ble to appellee if the judgment is affirmed on appeal. Id. The parties to an appeal
bond consist of the principal (appellant), the obligee or party protected by the bond
(appellee), and the surety (typically an insurance company) who agrees to be legally
liable to pay appellee if the judgment is affirmed and the principal is unable to satisfy
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The family that had treated the Telegraph as a stewardship through
four generations was forced to file for bankruptcy protection to pre-
serve its viability as a going concern.
As a haunting and cautionary tale about the relationship between
reporters and their sources in agencies of government, the case of the
Alton Telegraph is a very good story.9  It earned plaintiff’s counsel a
place in the Guinness Book of World Records.10  For his family’s he-
roic efforts to save the Telegraph, the publisher received the prestigi-
ous John Peter Zenger Award for Freedom of the Press and the
People’s Right to Know.11  Inspired by subsequent developments in
the judgment. Id. The principal signs an indemnity agreement, promising to reimburse
the surety if the surety is made to pay. Id. The surety will require the principal to
furnish a letter of credit or other form of collateral. Id. The principal pays an annual
premium, typically 1–2% of the amount of the bond. Id. Agencies of the federal gov-
ernment are not required to post an appeal bond. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c).
8. Posting an appeal bond is technically not a requirement for filing an appeal.
Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 942, 946 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). Rather it is a
device that stays enforcement of the judgment by execution against defendant’s assets
during the pendency of the appellate process. Id. In theory, a defendant can appeal
without posting a bond, but then the plaintiff would be free to execute on the judg-
ment while the appeal was pending. Richard G. Stuhan & Sean P. Costello, The Ap-
peal Bond—What It Is, How It Works, and Why It Needs to Be Factored Into Your
Litigation Strategy, http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/983c1326-51c1-4ebc-9e
6e-001ef4268418/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/daa0a1a0-c224-4cde-a744-64d8
0a235d12/Spring_2008_The_Appeal_Bond.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). In Obsid-
ian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, after obtaining summary judgment for $2.5 million in
damages in a defamation suit against an Internet blogger, plaintiff sought to execute
on the judgment by asking the sheriff to seize and sell to the highest bidder (who
would presumably be plaintiff) the “intangible personal property” owned by defen-
dant, consisting of defendant’s right to appeal. Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 812 F.
Supp. 1220 (D. Or. 2011). If this novel judgment execution stratagem succeeds, defen-
dant, who could not afford to post a supersedeas bond, will lose the right to appeal.
The case, which is currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, raises the issue to be discussed, infra, in Part V of this Article. The central
issue in Obsidian, whether the full panoply of First Amendment protections is availa-
ble only to institutional media, is beyond the scope of this Article. See Eugene
Volokh, May Plaintiff Cut Off a Poor Defendant’s Right to Appeal by Having the
Sheriff Sell Off Defendant’s Right to Appeal (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.volokh.com/
2013/01/11/may-plaintiff-cut-off-a-poor-defendants-appeal-by-having-the-sheriff-sell-
off-defendants-right-to-appeal/.
9. Although once a subject of controversy, the value of narrative in legal scholar-
ship is no longer a matter of dispute. See, e.g., Paul A. Lombardo, Legal Archaeology:
Recovering the Stories Behind the Cases, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 589 (2008); Jean C.
Love, Commentary, The Value of Narrative in Legal Scholarship and Teaching, 2 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 87 (1998). Since 2005, Foundation Press has published an
entire “law stories” series which now contains thirty-seven titles.
10. See infra note 90.
11. The University of Arizona School of Journalism has presented this award, now
known as the John Peter and Anna Catherine Zenger Award, annually since 1954 in
the cause of freedom of the press and the people’s right to know. The John Peter and
Anna Catherine Zenger Award, U. ARIZ. SCH. JOURNALISM, http://journalism.arizona.
edu/zenger (last visited Jan. 4, 2014). In 1734 Zenger was charged with seditious libel
for publishing news stories critical of royal government officials in colonial New York.
Id. His wife continued to publish the New York Weekly Journal while her husband
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Madison County, the appeal bond process in most states has since
been reformed. However, a media organization could still be crippled
by the inability to seek appellate review of a sizeable damages award,
which is why the Telegraph Case retains its claim to our attention as it
nears its thirty-fifth anniversary.
Following the Introduction, Part II of this Article explores the
events leading to the Telegraph Case. Part III examines the proceed-
ings at the trial court level. Part IV describes the surreal aftermath in
which eleven grounds of error were never considered by an appellate
tribunal for lack of an appeal bond. Part V argues that, without signifi-
cant re-imagination, the supersedeas bond requirement may violate an
emerging right to appeal. Meanwhile, as it applies to organizations
engaged in newsgathering and dissemination, the appeal bond process
abridges freedom of the press and the people’s right to know.
II. BACKSTORY
“Every lawsuit is a potential drama: a story of conflict, often with
victims and villains, leading to justice done or denied.”12  In any
drama, the place in which events unfold can profoundly influence the
outcome.13  In the Telegraph Case, the city of Alton itself functions as
a principal character.
Alton was named in honor of his firstborn son by Rufus Easton, a
prominent lawyer and land speculator who served as the first postmas-
ter of St. Louis.14  By reason of its proximity to St. Louis,15 and its
location near the confluence of three navigable rivers,16 Easton per-
ceived the natural advantages of the site as the base for a passenger
ferry service.17  By 1818 Easton had acquired much of the land that
was imprisoned for ten months before being brought to trial. Id. Zenger’s acquittal by
a jury after deliberating for ten minutes established the principle that truth is a de-
fense against libel, and is regarded as helping to lay the foundation for the First
Amendment. See Allen Pusey, John Peter Zenger Acquitted, A.B.A. J. 72 (Aug. 2013);
The Trial of John Peter Zenger, NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/feha/history
culture/the-trial-of-john-peter-zenger.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). Paul S. Cousley,
the third generation of Cousleys to serve as publisher of the Telegraph, was the 1981
recipient of the Zenger Award. Id.
12. Lombardo, supra note 9, at 589.
13. According to classic Aristotelian theory, place is one of the three unities (to-
gether with time and action) of dramatic construction. Classical Dramatic Structure,
http://www.math.brown.edu/~banchoff/Yale/project04/th-class.html (last visited Dec.
27, 2013).
14. W.R. BRINK, HISTORY OF MADISON COUNTY, ILLINOIS 375 (1882).
15. Alton is twenty-five miles northeast of St. Louis. About Alton, http://www.
riverbender.com/officespace/about_alton.cfm (last visited July 27, 2013).
16. The Corps of Discovery, led by Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, em-
barked in May 1804 from a point near the confluence of the Mississippi and Missouri
Rivers in what is now the town of Hartford, Illinois. DAYTON DUNCAN & KEN
BURNS, LEWIS & CLARK 21 (1997).
17. Evidence of Easton’s primary reason for his interest in the location is found in
the deeds conveying parcels of land in Alton in which he expressly reserved ferry
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comprised Alton when it was chartered as a city by the Illinois legisla-
ture in 1837.18
Easton’s vision proved correct. Alton flourished as a thriving center
for transportation and commerce throughout the steamboat era of the
1820s and 1830s.19  Steamships carried cargo from the Illinois River to
the north and the Missouri River to the south to the Port of St. Louis
and down the Mississippi River to New Orleans. Although Mark
Twain was unimpressed by his visit,20 Alton’s prime location and the
region’s abundant limestone, coal, and timber resources attracted an
influx of entrepreneurs and talented craftsmen.21  Prominent among
them was Lucas J. Pfeiffenberger, who designed dozens of private
residences, churches, and public buildings of architectural significance,
and served four terms as mayor of Alton between 1872 and 1883.22
Pfeiffenberger also served as the first president of the Piasa Building
and Loan Association,23 the predecessor to the Piasa First Federal
Savings & Loan Association (Piasa),24 whose failure was central to the
Telegraph Case.25
By the middle of the nineteenth century Alton was one of the most
important and enterprising cities in Illinois.26  Alton boasted four
rights for himself and his heirs. DORA BROWN TICKNER, HISTORY OF ALTON, ILLI-
NOIS 5–6 (1958).
18. BRINK, supra note 14, at 389.
19. Easton did not personally benefit financially from his investment. KRISTIE C.
WOLFERMAN, THE INDOMINABLE MARY EASTON SIBLEY: PIONEER OF WOMEN’S ED-
UCATION IN MISSOURI 33, 45 (2008). His heavy speculation in Alton real estate left
him in “straightened circumstances for the rest of his life.” Id.
20. Alton was the first community outside of Missouri that Samuel Clemens saw
when he left home in 1853 at the age of eighteen and sailed down the Mississippi to
St. Louis. B. CLAY SHANNON, STILL CASTING SHADOWS: A SHARED MOSAIC OF U.S.
HISTORY 201 (2006). He described Alton as “a dismal little river town full of death,
disease, disaster, violence and murder.” Id.
21. Alton attracted immigrants from Scotland, Ireland, England, and Germany.
MERWIN G. FAIRBANKS, A HISTORY OF NEWSPAPER JOURNALISM IN ALTON, ILLI-
NOIS 17 (1973). “It is hard to believe that at one time in history our city was an indus-
trial mecca.” WOLFERMAN, supra note 19, at 45.
22. Pfeiffenberger stopped in Alton in 1857 en route to the gold rush in California
and never left. SUSAN H. EASTMAN, RIVER BEND: AN AREA THAT KNOWS NO PAN-
ICS 63 (1981).
23. Obituary of Lucas J. Pfeiffenberger, MADISON COUNTY ILGENWEB, http://
madison.illinoisgenweb.org/Obituaries/obituariesP.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
Upon his death, his son, James Mather Pfeiffenberger, succeeded his father as presi-
dent of Piasa. Id.
24. According to Native American legend, the Piasa bird was a fierce, winged
monster dreaded for carrying villagers off one by one to a cave along the river bank at
the site of what would later become Alton, where they would be eaten. FAIRBANKS,
supra note 21, at 2–3. Ouatogo, an Illini chief, finally was able to trick the creature
into making an attack, whereupon twenty warriors armed with bows and poisoned
arrows ambushed and succeeded in killing the giant bird. Id. An image of the Piasa
bird is painted on a bluff overlooking the river.
25. See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
26. Chicago & Alton Railway, KINGDOM CALLAWAY HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.kch-
soc.org/carr_article.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
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newspapers at the time, including the Telegraph, which published its
first issue on January 15, 1836.27  It was home to more than 100 indus-
tries engaged in brewing, baking, and banking among others, and in-
stitutions of higher education.28  Alton was growing faster than St.
Louis and was almost as large as Chicago.29  The city hosted the final
senatorial debate between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas
in 185830 and was a leading candidate to become Illinois’ state
capital.31
Significant income and wealth disparity was a byproduct of the
city’s rapid industrial growth, resulting in the sorting of Alton’s re-
sidents into sections separated by geography and social class.32  Pfeif-
fenberger and other architects designed magnificent Queen Anne
Victorian, Italianate, and Georgian Revival mansions built of stone or
brick on the bluffs in the Middletown district of the city for the fami-
lies of steamboat captains and captains of industry. Working-class
families settled in neighborhoods of one-story frame houses in the
flood-prone low-lying areas closer to the river.33
A tragic event threatened Alton’s growing prosperity and enshrined
the city in the history of the nation’s struggle for freedom of the press
a century before the Telegraph Case. In what has been described as
the first battle of the Civil War,34 the abolitionist Elijah Parish
27. It began as the four-page Alton Weekly Telegraph and was known as the Al-
ton Evening Telegraph in the 1960s. FAIRBANKS, supra note 21.  Other Alton newspa-
pers were the Spectator, the Observer and the Temperance Herald. Id.
28. Major employers included Laclede Steel, Owens Illinois Glass Company, Stan-
dard Oil, and Western Cartridge Company. Our Alton . . . 175 years ago (1837), HAY-
NER PUB. LIBR. DISTRICT (Summer 2012), http://www.haynerlibrary.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/06/2012-Summer-Newsletter.pdf.
29. “In 1836, easterners had referred to Alton as the Queen of the West. It vied
with St. Louis in importance as a port city.” SHANNON, supra note 20, at 202.
30. On October 15, 1858, after arriving in Alton before dawn aboard the steam-
ship City of Louisiana, Lincoln dined with Senator Lyman Trumble in the Christian
Hill neighborhood before strolling down the square for his seventh debate with Doug-
las. Historic Christian Hill, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 24, 1978, at 14.
31. BRINK, supra note 14, at 379. Alton received the most votes in a statewide
election held in 1834 to choose the capital, but its narrow margin over Springfield was
deemed inconclusive. Why Alton Is Not the Capital of Illinois, MADISON COUNTY
ILGENWEB, http://madison.illinoisgenweb.org/alton_not_capital.html (last visited
Dec. 12, 2013).
32. “The majority of Upper Alton’s inhabitants were Northerners from New En-
gland and New York. Alton was a city divided by the Upper Town and the Lower
Town, by Northern Yankees and Southern sympathizers, by an upper business class
and a lower laboring class.”  Judy Hoffman, “If I fall, my grave shall be made in Al-
ton”: Elijah Lovejoy, Martyr for Abolition, GATEWAY: Q. (Spring 2005).
33. CHERYL EICHAR JETT, ALTON 8 (2009). Even laborers, bricklayers and stone-
masons earned an exceptional wage of $1 to $3 daily compared to 40-cents being paid
elsewhere. HAYNER PUB. LIBR. DISTRICT, supra note 28.
34. Editorial, Commemorate Elijah Lovejoy with a Stamp, ST. LOUIS POST-DIS-
PATCH, Feb. 22, 2010, at A14.
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Lovejoy, a Presbyterian minister35 and editor of the Alton Observer,
was murdered in Alton.36  In response to his editorializing against
slavery, Lovejoy’s printing press had been dismantled and thrown into
the Mississippi River by a pro-slavery mob.37  After this happened for
the third time, Lovejoy resolved to defend his property.
On the night of November 7, 1837, an alcohol-fueled mob carrying
guns, clubs, stones, and torches surrounded the Godfrey, Gilman &
Company warehouse on the Mississippi riverfront. One man climbed
a ladder up the three-story building intent on setting fire to the prem-
ises for the purpose of destroying Lovejoy’s fourth printing press,
which he had surreptitiously shipped from Cincinnati the previous
night.38  Standing with his supporters on the roof, Lovejoy was killed
by shotgun blasts fired from the mob.39
News of Lovejoy’s death was reported throughout the nation and
prompted countless editorials, pamphlets, and sermons. The national
publicity galvanized public support for the antislavery movement40
35. At the time of his death Lovejoy was serving as the first pastor of the present-
day College Avenue Presbyterian Church, then known as Upper Alton Presbyterian
Church. Our History, C. AVENUE PRESBYTERIAN, http://collegeavepres.org/index.php
?pagekey=aboutus_history (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
36. In Lovejoy’s honor, the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution abolishing
slavery was drafted in Alton. Illinois in Focus: A Photographic Tour of the Land of
Lincoln, www.illinoisinfocus.com/alton-elijah-lovejoy.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
Alton recently observed the 175th anniversary of Lovejoy’s martyrdom. Kathie Bas-
sett, Free Speech Martyr Honored on 175th Anniversary of Death, TELEGRAPH (Nov.
4, 2012), http://www.thetelegraph.com/news/local/article_d4b0b154-263d-11e2-bdb5-
0019bb30f31a.html.
37. Born in Maine in 1802, Lovejoy moved to St. Louis in 1832 and became editor
of the St. Louis Times. See generally PAUL SIMON, FREEDOM’S CHAMPION—ELIJAH
LOVEJOY (1994); PAUL SIMON, LOVEJOY: MARTYR TO FREEDOM (1964). Lovejoy’s
strident editorials against slavery prompted a local judge, Luke E. Lawless, to declare
the paper a threat to democracy. Id. Lovejoy had previously called Judge Lawless an
“Irish papist” for not prosecuting those responsible for lynching a local black cook. Id.
Fearing for himself and his young wife, Lovejoy fled St. Louis and relocated across
the river to the free state of Illinois in September 1836 where he became editor of the
Alton Observer. Id.
38. T. J. Greaney, Famed Editor Merits Stamp of Approval, COLUMBIA DAILY
TRIB. (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.columbiatribune.com/opinion/columnists/famed-edi-
tor-merits-stamp-of-approval/article_c763a9c2-dc33-5486-8608-97b0f5b4e249.html.
39. No one was ever convicted of a crime in connection with Lovejoy’s murder.
TICKNER, supra note 17, at 17.
40. Lovejoy’s death was an “earthquake” sending shock waves through America
and “felt in the most distant regions of the earth.”  John Quincy Adams, Introduction
to JOSEPH C. LOVEJOY AND OWEN LOVEJOY, MEMOIR OF THE REV. ELIJAH P.
LOVEJOY 12 (1838). By its mobilization of antislavery sentiment, Lovejoy’s martyr-
dom was a turning point in American history comparable in significance to Harriet
Beecher Stowe’s publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. John Brown stood up at the end
of a memorial prayer meeting in Ohio and announced, “Here, before God, in the
presence of these witnesses, from this time, I consecrate my life to the destruction of
slavery!”  Letter from Professor Iver Bernstein, Washington University in St. Louis
(Oct. 12, 2009) (on file with author). In an address on the centennial anniversary of
Lovejoy’s death, President Herbert Hoover said, “Since his martyrdom, no man has
openly challenged free speech and the free press in America.”  Former President Her-
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and left Alton’s reputation permanently scarred.41
Lovejoy is remembered as both the first casualty of the Civil War42
and as the first martyr to the cause of freedom of the press.43  The
printing press Lovejoy died defending was carried to a window and
thrown onto the river bank, where it was broken into pieces that were
scattered in the Mississippi River.44  The main frame of the hand-press
was recovered in 1915 and resides in a place of honor in the front
lobby of the Alton Telegraph.45
bert Hoover, Centennial Observance of Martyrdom of Elijah Parish Lovejoy Address
at Colby College (Nov. 8, 1937) (transcript available at http://www.colby.edu/lovejoy/
recipients/hoover_r.shtml).
41. Some historians blame the notoriety of Lovejoy’s murder for Alton’s long and
persistent economic decline. “Alton’s prosperity and hopes for the future were gone.
The city that was noted for the quality of its citizenry, its benevolence, and its men of
influence, witnessed a steady exodus of its most progressive and prosperous citizens.
Alton was an ostracized city with a devastated economy.”  Hoffman, supra note 32.
Other historians disagree, citing completion of the first railroad to Alton, the Chicago
and Alton, as a catalyst in the city’s resurgence. “[F]or some years subsequent to 1837,
trade was stagnant and prosperity depreciated, while many of the most enterprising
business firms met with financial ruin. About the year 1842, business revived again,
and from that time on the city has had a healthy, steady and constant growth.”
BRINK, supra note 14, at 389. Economic conditions in Alton, and the rest of south-
western Illinois, suffered more serious and permanent damage in the 1970s following
enactment of the first federal environmental laws, which rendered the region’s virtu-
ally inexhaustible supply of bituminous coal unmarketable because of its high sulfur
content. Id.
42. A four-ton bronze statue of Winged Victory on a ninety-three-foot granite col-
umn in Alton Cemetery is a towering monument to Lovejoy’s memory and the tallest
in Illinois. The Lovejoy Monument, http://www.state.il.us/hpa/lovejoy/monument.htm
(last visited Dec. 27, 2013). According to an inscription, Lovejoy engaged in “the first
armed resistance to the aggressions of the slave power in America.” Id.
43. Lovejoy personifies the impact of the abolitionist movement on the evolution
of freedom of expression. Before 1837, much of the press had been timid in defense of
free speech for abolitionists, who were regarded by many as fanatics. Lovejoy’s mar-
tyrdom demonstrated how violation of the free speech rights of the unpopular
threatened the rights of all. Before 1837, the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of
speech and the press were understood simply as protections against interference by
government. Lovejoy’s martyrdom demonstrated that, in order to be meaningful,
freedom of expression necessarily includes protection from private violence. Michael
K. Curtis, Free Speech, Mobs, Republican Government, and the Privileges of American
Citizens, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1109 (1997). See also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE
SPEECH, THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE: STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRES-
SION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000). Lovejoy was an 1826 graduate of Colby College
in Maine. Elijah Parish Lovejoy Journalism Award, COLBY, http://www.colby.edu/
academics_cs/goldfarb/lovejoy/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). Each year since 1952
Colby has conferred the Elijah Parish Lovejoy Award on a journalist whose work
upholds the Lovejoy tradition. Id. In his remarks upon receiving the award in 1983,
New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis described the chilling impact the Tele-
graph Case would have on the willingness of newspapers to engage in investigative
journalism. Anthony Lewis, Convocation Address, http://www.colby.edu/lovejoy/re-
cipients/lewis_r.shtml. See infra note 145.
44. As reported in the Alton Observer, Nov. 7, 1837, available at http://www.alton
web.com/history/lovejoy/ao1.htm.
45. COUSLEY, supra note 6, at 6.
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Thirteen years after Lovejoy’s murder, John A. Cousley emigrated
to Alton from Ulster as part of a mass exodus seeking to escape the
Irish potato famine.46  He went to work for the Telegraph in 1860 as
an apprentice, known as a “printer’s devil.”47  By 1891 Cousley had
saved enough money to purchase a majority interest in the Telegraph
from publisher and principal owner Wilbur T. Norton.48  Cousley was
succeeded as publisher by his son, Paul Bliss Cousley, in 1913, and by
his grandson, Paul Sparks Cousley, in 1962.49  By the time of the Tele-
graph Case, the paper was one of the oldest family-owned newspapers
in the U.S. with a circulation of 38,000.50
By the late 1960s the Telegraph had earned a reputation for award-
winning51 investigative journalism52 and had made some enemies in
the process.53  In 1968 Telegraph city editor Elmer Broz assigned two
reporters, William Lhotka and Joseph Melosi, to investigate rumors
that construction trade unions in Madison County had been infiltrated
by members of organized crime families with headquarters in Chi-
46. From 1846 to 1851, during the period known as the Great Potato Famine, it is
estimated that as many as 800,000 people died of disease and starvation in Ireland,
and close to one million emigrated to the U.S. and Canada. THE FAMINE IMMIGRANTS
xii–xv (Ira A. Glazier, ed. 1983).
47. Joseph J. Dromgoole, Boyhood Friendship Grew to Partnership of Cousley,
McAdams, ALTON EVENING TELEGRAPH, Jan. 15, 1936, at 5.
48. FAIRBANKS, supra note 21, at 306.
49. Id. at 235, 307–08. By the time of the Telegraph Case, Stephen A. Cousley, a
second cousin of Paul S. Cousley, was editor and assistant to the publisher. Id. at 308.
50. McBride, supra, note 3. The Telegraph was the largest daily newspaper in
Madison County. COUSLEY, supra note 6, at 9.
51. “Its crusading editors brought home awards and commendations.” CONRAD
C. FINK, STRATEGIC NEWSPAPER MANAGEMENT 308 (1995). From 1958 to 1962, the
Telegraph was cited twenty-two times for its achievements, including for excellence in
local news coverage and exposure of scandal and fraud. FAIRBANKS, supra note 21, at
318.
52. “[T]he Alton Telegraph had a reputation in its community and throughout Illi-
nois for responsible and significant investigative reporting. Over the years the paper
had reported a variety of cases of crime and corruption that might otherwise not have
come to light.” PETER E. KANE, ERRORS, LIES AND LIBEL 113 (1992) (italics in origi-
nal). Investigative journalism conducted by the Telegraph in 1969 uncovered a conflict
of interest scandal that led to the resignation of two Illinois Supreme Court justices.
KENNETH A. MANASTER, ILLINOIS JUSTICE: THE SCANDAL OF 1969 AND THE RISE OF
JOHN PAUL STEVENS 151–52 (2001). After Chicago newspapers picked up the story
initially reported by the Telegraph that the justices were stockholders in a financial
institution that was a party to an appeal, the state legislature appointed John Paul
Stevens, then a private practitioner, as independent counsel to conduct an investiga-
tion, setting the stage for Stevens’s appointment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in 1970 and as an associate justice of the Supreme Court in 1975. Id.
53. Editor Stephen Cousley speculated that the Telegraph Case may have been
part of an effort by the local Democratic Party political machine to put the paper out
of business in response to its long tradition of vigorous investigative reporting. Mc-
Bride, supra note 3 (“We’ve done a pretty hard-nosed job of reporting on officialdom
in the county, digging into things over the years that need digging into. We consider
all our reporters to be investigative reporters, and a newspaper that is doing its job
will put a spotlight on political officials and judges. Over the years we’ve made a lot of
enemies.”).
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cago.54  In multiple conversations with the reporters during the course
of their investigation, a former Madison County Sheriff and the Chief
Investigator for the Sheriff’s Office shared their suspicions about why
Piasa had grown in size unusually rapidly:55  Piasa was being used to
launder the proceeds of illicit Mafia activities in Chicago56 by making
loans to finance real estate development in Madison County by a con-
struction company headed by Piasa’s largest customer, James C.
Green.57
Green had been solicited as a banking customer by Robert L.
DeGrand, Piasa’s Executive Vice President.58  Green claimed to be
the biggest builder of four-family housing units south of Chicago, with
all of his financing provided by Piasa.59  After the Telegraph reported
that Piasa had loaned money to Donald Hazel, a convicted felon with
supposed organized crime connections, Piasa encouraged and facili-
tated Green’s acquisition of a portfolio of Hazel’s properties.60  The
$25 million of indebtedness owed to Piasa by Green’s construction
company and affiliated entities exceeded by six times the limit on the
amount that Piasa could legally lend to a single borrower,61 a key
component of federal banking regulation.62
After several months of fruitless investigation, Lhotka and Pelosi
were unable to confirm the speculation about Piasa’s alleged involve-
ment in money laundering. Unwilling to report rumors without verifi-
able evidence,63 they instead prepared a typed three-page, single-
spaced memorandum, dated March 26, 1969, describing in considera-
54. Rumors of a possible connection between Piasa and organized crime had been
circulating in the Alton community for several years prior to 1969. Brief of Appellants
at 6, James C. Green v. Alton Telegraph Printing Co., 438 N.E.2d 203 (No. 80-602)
(App. Ct. Ill. Jul. 28, 1981).
55. Id. at 5. Piasa had grown from assets of $10 million to more than $100 million
in a ten-year period. COUSLEY, supra, note 6, at 7.
56. COUSLEY, supra, note 6, at 5.
57. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 54.
58. A fellow officer of Piasa at the time was Dr. Mather Pfeiffenberger, grandson
of architect Lucas Pfeiffenberger. See supra text accompanying note 22. The Author,
who currently lives in the house where Mather Pfeiffenberger raised his family, first
became aware of the Telegraph Case as a result of a chance encounter with
DeGrand’s son, Thomas A. DeGrand. “I used to play in your house as a child,” Tom
DeGrand told the Author in summer 2012.
59. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 23.
60. The reporters’ sources in the Madison County Sheriff’s Office indicated that
Hazel was a silent partner in Green’s biggest projects, and that Green was a front man
for Hazel and other hoodlums. Id. at 8.
61. KANE, supra note 52, at 114.
62. Regulatory limitations on loans to one borrower “are a critical safety and
soundness standard . . . to prevent . . . insured [financial institutions] from placing
themselves at risk by concentrating too great a portion of their assets in any single
borrower.” OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, EXAMINATION HANDBOOK § 211.1
(Dec. 2007), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/422037.pdf.
63. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 11.
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ble factual detail a “possible link between the Chicago family of the
Cosa Nostra and Piasa” in Madison County.64
In their memorandum the reporters wrote that “a criminal con-
glomerate appears to be flourishing unchecked in Madison County,”
that “Hazel, reportedly the No. 2 crime boss in the county, is con-
nected with James Green Construction Co., a multimillion dollar op-
eration,” and that “Hazel is a silent partner on some of Green’s
biggest apartment projects. . . . It is unclear as to how these men are
connected with the Mafia. But all are associates of hoods . . . .”  The
memorandum solicited the help of the U.S. Department of Justice “to
put all the pieces together,”65 in which event the reporters expected to
receive preferential treatment, in the form of a “scoop,” if federal law
enforcement officials were able to verify the information.66  The re-
porters transmitted the memorandum, marked “Confidential” in large
capital letters on every page,67 to Brian Conboy, a Special Prosecutor
who headed a task force of the Organized Crime and Racketeering
Section of the Department of Justice with whom the reporters had
met during the course of a broad-based federal investigation into or-
ganized crime, labor racketeering, and official corruption in and
around St. Louis.68
The reporters assumed that the memorandum would be seen only
by investigators in the Justice Department.69  However, Conboy’s suc-
cessor disclosed the substance of the memorandum to officials of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the Board).70  In August 1969 a
team of investigators from the Board in Chicago arrived at the offices
of Piasa to conduct an expedited annual examination of the institu-
tion. In response to a question, DeGrand was told that the investiga-
tion had been prompted by a memorandum from a Telegraph
reporter. During the course of a six-week examination, investigators
uncovered no evidence of organized crime money passing through
Piasa to Green or otherwise.71  They did discover unrelated regulatory
violations and irregularities, including the magnitude of loans by Piasa
to Green in excess of federal banking limits and inflated appraisals of
real property pledged by Green as collateral for loans.72  In an effort
64. Id. at 13.
65. KANE, supra note 52, at 115.
66. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 15.
67. Id. at 12.
68. Id. at 9. The suggestion for the memorandum originated with Conboy and con-
formed to the customary practice of federal prosecutors at the time. Id. at 11.
69. G. MICHAEL KILLENBERG, PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORTING NOW: NEWS OF, BY
AND FOR THE PEOPLE 337 (2008). “They had confidence in the discretion of the Jus-
tice Department, and believed that its investigation would be closed if it could not
verify the memorandum through its informants.”  Brief of Appellants, supra note 54,
at 15.
70. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 17.
71. Id. at 18.
72. Id. at 19.
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to correct the deficiencies identified by the Board, Piasa discontinued
extending further credit to Green in November 1969.73
After the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported that Piasa was under
federal investigation for questionable lending policies and practices,
and with rumors circulating about organized crime connections, de-
positors withdrew their savings in a run on the bank.74  Ultimately the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation arranged for the
merger of Piasa into Illini Federal Savings & Loan Association (Illini
Federal),75 which obtained the appointment of a receiver for Green’s
properties, citing dangerously high vacancy rates and arrearages in the
payment of rent.76
III. TRIAL
The Telegraph Case was one of a series of nine lawsuits filed by
attorney Rex Carr on behalf of Green to recover damages arising
from the loss of his investment properties as a consequence of Piasa’s
failure.77  In a complaint against the Telegraph, Melosi, and Lhotka,
filed on July 26, 1977,78 Green claimed the reporters’ memorandum
was defamatory, and its transmittal was the proximate cause of his
inability to obtain financing for his projects and ultimately for their
loss.79
Because an overwhelming majority of libel suits are decided on mo-
tions for summary judgment,80 the Telegraph underestimated the like-
lihood that the case would ever go to trial.81  But the Telegraph Case
had been filed in Madison County, whose judges have a reputation for
routinely refusing to grant defendants’ pre-trial motions82 and whose
73. Id. at 21.
74. Id. at 56.
75. Id. at 22.
76. The Internal Revenue Service had filed a lien against Green’s construction
company for failure to withhold payroll and social security taxes. THOMAS B. LITTLE-
WOOD, COALS OF FIRE 65 (1988). Multiple mechanic’s liens had been filed against its
properties by trade creditors. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 25.
77. Green was awarded damages of $3 million against Illini Federal as a result of a
separate lawsuit filed by Carr. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
78. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 27.
79. However, Green made no effort to obtain alternative sources of financing
elsewhere. Id. at 24.
80. Only 19% of all libel cases reach a jury. McBride, supra note 3.
81. As its lead attorney, the Telegraph selected William M. Cox, an inexperienced
litigator who had never tried a libel case. LITTLEWOOD, supra note 76, at 115.  The
paper retained Stephen Cousely’s brother-in-law, Charles Williamson, to represent
the reporters. Id.
82. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 248. “Few, if any, other jurisdictions in the United
States so reflexively deny defendants’ summary judgment motions.” Id. at 249.
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working-class juries are famous for their generosity to plaintiffs in-
jured by corporate defendants.83
In motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, the Telegraph ar-
gued that the reporting of allegations of wrongdoing to law enforce-
ment officials is absolutely privileged and that Green’s suit, which was
not filed until eight years after delivery of the reporters’ memoran-
dum, was barred by Illinois’ one-year statute of limitations for libel.
The court denied the paper’s motions based on the existence of dis-
puted factual issues.84
Trial began on April 28, 1980, and lasted five weeks.85  On June 3,
1980, after only five hours of deliberation, the jury awarded Green
$9.2 million, including $2.5 million in punitive damages, far exceeding
the Telegraph’s net worth of $3 million.86  By summarily denying de-
fendants’ post-trial motion on November 26, 1980, Madison County
Circuit Court Judge Charles Chapman declined the last clear chance
to correct the outcome.87
Legendary trial lawyer Edward Bennett Williams once observed
that a third of all cases can never be won, a third can never be lost,
and the battle over the remaining third is what makes or breaks a trial
lawyer’s reputation.88  Although Carr was already one of the most
successful plaintiffs’ lawyers in the country,89 the Telegraph Case
earned him a place in the Guinness Book of World Records.90
Carr’s advocacy in the Telegraph Case illustrates the effectiveness
of litigation tradecraft. A classic trial lawyer technique is to identify a
familiar image or analogy drawn from everyday life to help make a
83. Madison County, along with neighboring St. Clair County, is known as “Plain-
tiffs’ Paradise” for the staggering verdicts awarded by pro-plaintiff juries. JOHN A.
JENKINS, THE LITIGATORS 375 (1989).
84. On the statute of limitations question, there was a factual issue of when Green
first knew, or should have known, about the memorandum. Brief of Appellants, supra
note 54, at 27–28.
85. Id. at 31.
86. Id.
87. Id. Judge Chapman summarily denied the motion on the day before his last
day in office without issuing an opinion. COUSLEY, supra note 6, at 10.
88. G. Christopher Ritter, The Five Habits of Highly Successful Trial Lawyers,
http://www.thefocalpoint.com/uploads/articles/article_44.pdf (last visited Dec. 27,
2013). Carr could afford to be charitable to the Telegraph’s trial counsel, and un-
characteristically modest, in his characterization of the case. “There is no conceivable
way any lawyer could have won their side of the case.” LITTLEWOOD, supra note 76,
at 148. Carr’s evaluation of the case has remained unchanged. “I do think the case was
a lay-down case,” Carr recently wrote in an exchange of correspondence in which the
Author suggested that Carr was either being modest or gallant in defending the trial
judge whose handling of the case has been criticized by commentators. E-mail from
Rex Carr (Jul. 3, 2013, 12:43 PM) (on file with author). See infra note 119.
89. JENKINS, supra note 83, at 371.
90. Steve Gonzalez, Rex Carr: Champion of Victims, MADISON-ST. CLAIR REC.
(Dec. 22, 2004), http://www.madisonrecord.com/issues/308-telecommunications/13681
7-rex-carr-champion-of-victims.
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complex concept more easily understood.91  Carr convinced the jury
that what the Telegraph did was no different than allowing one of its
delivery trucks to run recklessly over Green, leaving him crippled.92
Jurors interviewed afterwards said they did not even consider abstract
First Amendment issues of press freedom. They deliberated primarily
over how much to award Green to compensate for his losses.93
Keeping the case simple is a technique shared by the most success-
ful trial lawyers.94  This technique is especially important in Madison
County, where an idiosyncratic selection process screened prospective
jurors for level of education, effectively limiting the number of col-
lege-educated citizens on the list of eligible jurors.95  Carr was deter-
mined to maintain the focus on the reporters’ misconduct in making
unfounded allegations in the memorandum about Piasa’s involvement
with mobsters, which he attributed to a combination of laziness and
personal greed.96  To this end Carr sought and obtained a crucial pre-
trial ruling on a motion in limine by Judge Chapman that limited testi-
mony about Green’s excessive borrowing and other irregularities un-
covered by the Board.97  This evidence was central to the Telegraph’s
key defense that the proximate cause of Green’s injury was Piasa’s
noncompliance with banking regulations and not the memorandum’s
allegations about Mafia connections.98  In support of his motion, Carr
argued that such evidence would “unduly complicate this trial and
make it extremely difficult for the jury to understand.”99
It requires a considerable investment of time and energy to know
the facts well enough to keep the case simple.100  By the time the Tele-
graph Case went to trial, Carr, by his own estimate, had devoted the
better part of one-third of the previous eight years to immersing him-
self in the details of the federal government’s investigation of Piasa.101
This later proved decisive in Carr’s withering five-day cross-examina-
tion of Albion Fenderson, General Counsel and Senior Vice President
of the Board. Fenderson had testified that the Board’s decision to or-
der Piasa to discontinue lending to Green was based solely upon the
91. Ritter, supra note 88.
92. KILLENBERG, supra note 69, at 337.
93. McBride, supra note 3. Jurors interviewed after the trial acknowledged being
under the misconception that a public body such as the school district would receive
the punitive damage award. LITTLEWOOD, supra, note 76, at 145. Although they re-
present an easy target, it would be unfair to blame jurors for the outcome of the
Telegraph Case. As in any trial, the jury reached its judgment based upon the evi-
dence it was permitted to hear and the instructions it received. Schwartz, supra note 3,
at 237.
94. Ritter, supra note 88.
95. LITTLEWOOD, supra note 76, at 84–85.
96. Id. at 139.
97. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 119–23.
98. Id. at 47–62.
99. LITTLEWOOD, supra note 76, at 119.
100. Ritter, supra note 88.
101. LITTLEWOOD, supra note 76, at 134.
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serious violations of banking regulations disclosed by its audit of Piasa
and not on the allegations in the memorandum about Green’s involve-
ment in money laundering.102  In addition to twice accusing Fenderson
of lying under oath,103 Carr made sure jurors knew that Fenderson
was not “one of them.”104
Reminiscent of the public outcry following Elijah Lovejoy’s mur-
der,105 the verdict in the Telegraph Case was the subject of reports by
wire services, major metropolitan newspapers and trade journals.106
Paul Findley, a former journalist and member of Congress represent-
ing Madison County, tried to rally support for the Telegraph.107  He
wrote letters to dozens of editors and publishers urging creation of a
legal defense committee to underwrite the cost of an appeal.108  “The
idea that a newspaper can be sued and possibly driven out of business
because of something it didn’t print is absurd,” Findley wrote in a
newspaper column.109  The overwhelming sentiment among the na-
tional news media was that of sympathy for the paper, with the nota-
ble exception of a story reported by Morley Safer on CBS’ Sixty
Minutes criticizing the Telegraph for engaging in substandard practices
in investigative journalism.110
102. Id. at 136.
103. Judge Chapman denied defense motions for a mistrial on both occasions. Brief
of Appellants, supra note 54, at 92. A veteran litigator knows when to deviate from
the conventional wisdom, such as asking an open-ended question or a question to
which the lawyer does not already know the answer. Accusing a witness of lying is
generally discouraged because of the risk that jurors may sympathize with a belea-
guered witness. Erin Fuchs, How to Destroy a Witness on the Stand, BUS. INSIDER
(July 9, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-destroy-a-witness-on-the-stand-
2013-7.
104. “You are a Harvard grad, aren’t you?” Carr asked the witness. LITTLEWOOD,
supra note 76, at 136.
105. Editor Stephen Cousley drew the comparison. “If we buckled up and rolled
over, we’d be giving up the Lovejoy tradition. Somebody has to stand up and fight.”
McBride, supra note 3.
106. Stories about the case appeared in the New York Times, Christian Science
Monitor, Chicago Sun-Times, Chicago Tribune, Washington Post, Miami Herald, Los
Angeles Times, San Francisco Examiner, Oakland Tribune, Fort Worth Star-Tele-
gram, Editor & Publisher, Arizona Daily Star, and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, among
many others. COUSLEY, supra note 6, at 11.
107. Id.
108. McBride, supra note 3.
109. In an interview, Findley told a reporter:
In my day I would feel duty bound to present whatever scuttlebutt I picked
up. The reporters weren’t trying to hang anybody. They were just trying to
cooperate. If this becomes precedent, then every citizen, especially report-
ers, is in trouble. They will be reluctant to keep notes and supply leads to law
enforcement officials. [This] threatens the very right and obligation of news-
papers to gather and disseminate information.
Id.
110. Safer’s is a minority opinion. During his time as publisher, Paul S. Cousley
earned the respect of his competition for his courage in giving young reporters the
freedom to follow their investigative instincts. MANASTER, supra note 52.
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IV. AFTERMATH
Nothing concentrates the mind quite like a seven-figure damages
award. If the Telegraph had not previously treated the case with the
seriousness it deserved,111 it signaled its intention to pursue a vigorous
appeal by retaining the Chicago law firm of Jenner & Block. The case
was assigned to Philip W. Tone, who had rejoined the firm in 1980
after serving as a United States District Judge and later as a member
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.112  Libel special-
ist David P. Sanders co-signed a 143-page brief filed with the Appel-
late Court of Illinois on July 28, 1981. At a cost of $100,000,113 it was
surely the most expensive brief never considered by an appellate
panel.
The brief led with the argument, which was initially raised by the
Telegraph in pretrial motions, that disclosures to public officials are
absolutely privileged.114  Although this is an issue on which authority
was divided, and was apparently unsettled in Illinois at the time of the
Telegraph Case, there is no doubt that such disclosure was privileged
if made in good faith.115  As evidence of the reporters’ lack of good
faith, Carr stressed their expectation of a “scoop” as a quid pro quo
for their information.116  This evidence was a two-edged sword for the
plaintiff. On the one hand, it established an essential element required
to hold an employer strictly liable on a respondeat superior theory:  In
preparing and transmitting the memorandum, the reporters were actu-
ated by a motive to serve their employer, as opposed to some personal
animus.117  On the other hand, it demonstrated that the reporters, as
responsible journalists, were unwilling to go to print without confir-
111. MARK SABLEMAN, MORE SPEECH, NOT LESS 110 (1997). The Telegraph
clearly had not appreciated the gravity of the situation. The paper quickly rejected a
pre-trial offer by Carr to settle the case for the $1 million of insurance coverage that
was available, in what would have been a record-setting settlement of a U.S. libel
case. LITTLEWOOD, supra note 76, at 118. Carr generally takes a contrarian view of
settlement. “A poor trial is better than a good settlement, because I’ve gotten all my
business from publicity about me and my cases. You don’t get any publicity from a
settlement.” JENKINS, supra note 83, at 372 (emphasis in original).
112. SR 0286, 2001 Leg., 92nd Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2001), available at www.ilga.gov/
legislation/legisnet92/srgroups/sr/920SR0286LV.html.
113. FINK, supra note 51.
114. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 32–44.
115. William A. Wick, A Libel Tragedy, 56 DEF. COUNSEL J. 19, 22 (1989).
116. LITTLEWOOD, supra note 76. Carr believes that he also succeeded in casting
doubt on Melosi’s credibility by challenging his testimony that a local contractor,
whose name Melosi insisted he could not recall, had implicated Green and DeGrand
in the use of Mafia money. E-mail from Rex Carr, supra note 88 (“He said he could
not remember the name of the source because he made himself forget the name be-
cause he knew he might be asked to identify his source. I suggested to him that he
concentrate on forgetting the name of ‘Rex Carr’ and see how successful he might be.
The jury visibly reacted to the question.”).
117. See, e.g., Nelson v. American-West African Line, 86 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 665 (1937) (reinstating suit against employer seeking
damages incurred by able seaman struck by drunken boatswain because agent’s use of
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mation from federal law enforcement officials of information previ-
ously obtained from sources in Madison County government.118  The
expectation of a scoop proves that the memorandum was a necessary
part of the reporters’ newsgathering process prior to publication. The
authors of the brief are not alone in believing that the trial judge
should have directed a verdict in favor of the Telegraph on this
point.119
Without explicitly accusing him of bias,120 the brief catalogued
Judge Chapman’s consistent pattern of rulings adverse to the Tele-
graph on matters of law and evidence121 and errors in his instructions
to the jury.122  Of the eleven separate grounds for error, the argument
portion of the brief devoted a disproportionately large amount of
the phrase “turn to” demonstrated he was acting on behalf of employer in the process
of rudely awakening plaintiff in sufficient time to assume his watch).
118. In Doe v. Daily News, L.P., the trial judge cited absolute reporters’ privilege in
granting defendants’ motion dismissing a libel suit filed by a rape victim who had
been falsely accused of perpetrating a hoax by columnist Mike McAlary, the subject
of a 2013 Broadway play by Nora Ephron entitled “Lucky Guy.” Doe v. Daily News,
L.P., 660 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1997).  McAlary admitted that he had not inter-
viewed the victim or any witness, and had relied solely upon information provided by
sources inside the New York City Police Department. See Martin Garbus, The Dam-
age Done by a “Lucky Guy,” N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2013, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2013/04/03/opinion/the-damage-done-by-a-lucky-guy.html?_r=0. The court
held that the First Amendment precludes liability from being imposed on reporters
who rely upon erroneous information from official sources. Doe, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
119. Wick, supra note 115, at 23. No response to the brief was ever filed on behalf
of Green. Id. In an exchange of correspondence with the Author, Carr rejected the
“argument that there was a freedom of the press privilege protecting this information
not published but given to the [federal government] by a reporter seeking a story. . . .
Freedom of the press to malign and slander others is limited to articles published in
the paper in good faith, not to information published privately to law enforcement
agencies for the purpose of getting a story.”  E-mail from Rex Carr, supra note 88.
120. It has not gone unnoticed that Judge Chapman, himself a former plaintiffs’
lawyer, presided over the Telegraph Case while serving the balance of his term as a
lame-duck following his defeat in a judicial election in which he had sought unsuccess-
fully to obtain the Telegraph’s endorsement. See, e.g., KANE, supra note 52, at 117;
COUSLEY, supra note 6, at 9. Although the brief avoided direct personal criticism of
Judge Chapman, the argument section began by blaming trial court error as having
“resulted in the outrageous spectacle now to be reviewed by this Court.”  Brief of
Appellants, supra note 54, at 32.
121. Among the most damaging of Judge Chapman’s rulings was his refusal to per-
mit evidence to be introduced that Green had already recovered $3 million from Illini
Federal in recoupment for the same losses claimed in his libel suit against the Tele-
graph. See sources cited supra note 103 and accompanying text. Judge Chapman’s pre-
trial rulings on the reporters’ privilege and statute of limitations issues were cited as
grounds for reversal or remand for a new trial, as were his refusals to grant a mistrial
on the basis of misconduct by plaintiff’s counsel. Id.
122. Among Judge Chapman’s questionable instructions was advising the jury that
damages could be awarded for lost future profits. Illinois courts have long held that
lost profits must be established with certainty in order to constitute an element of
damages. TAS Distributing Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 491 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir.
2007). Even in Madison County, a properly instructed jury might have regarded lost
future profits in a field as competitive and market-sensitive as real estate develop-
ment to be too speculative to be provable with certainty.
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space (25%) to the claim that the Telegraph had been denied a fair
trial by reason of juror passion and prejudice, kindled by Carr’s perva-
sive gross misconduct in the jurors’ presence.123
Damage awards against newsgathering organizations for defama-
tion are among the most likely to be reversed on appeal,124 or substan-
tially reduced.125  Besides the possibility that it was generated by juror
passion and prejudice,126 the award of $2.5 million in punitive dam-
ages was reversible on other grounds. At the time of the Telegraph
Case, Illinois followed the so-called “complicity rule,” by which an
123. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 88–116. Fenderson was not the only wit-
ness Carr accused of lying under oath in the presence of the jury. See supra note 103
and accompanying text. As part of his impeachment of Melosi, described in note 116,
supra, Carr asked whether the witness had studied in journalism school “how Goeb-
bels of the Nazi Party made the science of the big lie a real skill and a real science.”
Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 99. Carr would similarly invoke the name of the
Nazi propaganda minister, and reference to the “big lie,” during closing argument in
1987 on behalf of a class of plaintiffs in a toxic tort case against the Monsanto Com-
pany. JENKINS, supra note 83, at 428. In reading the 4,000-page trial transcript, Philip
Tone, a strong proponent of courtroom civility, likely would have been more outraged
by Carr’s riffs than someone more familiar with the rough-and-tumble standards of
practice in Madison County. James Janega, Jurist Won Respect from Peers, CHI. TRIB.
(Nov. 30, 2001), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-11-30/news/0111300046_1_su-
perb-judge-lawyer-and-judge-jimmy-carter. See JENKINS, supra note 83, at 376. Carr’s
accusing witnesses of lying under oath in the presence of the jury was the brief’s prin-
cipal example of attorney misconduct. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 92. How-
ever, it cited no binding precedent for the proposition that it is prejudicial error in
Illinois to deny a motion for a mistrial on this basis in a civil suit, and research has
disclosed no Illinois case to this effect. Id.
124. KANE, supra note 52, at 120–21. Seventy percent of libel judgments against
publishers are reversed on appeal. Gary A. Parazino, The Future of Libel Law and
Independent Appellate Review, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 477, 483 (1985).
125. Even when verdicts are upheld, damages are often reduced substantially.  Ac-
cording to former CBS News division president Richard S. Salant:
Juries routinely award . . . extravagant punitive damages of millions, some-
times tens of millions of dollars. Just as routinely, the appellate judges re-
duce the punitive damages, or simply remove them. It is a senseless ritual in
which only the attorneys win. All the publicity centers on the original award,
and that encourages other libel litigations.
Richard Salant, Libel Speeches and Articles, NEW CANAAN LIBR. DIGITAL COLLEC-
TIONS, http://newcanaanlibrary.info/omeka/items/show/8 (last visited July 27, 2013).
Former Miss Wyoming Kim Pring was awarded $26.5 million in damages in February
1981 after Penthouse published a fictional account of the bizarre sexual behavior of a
thinly disguised Miss Wyoming. Pring v. Penthouse Int’l., Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983) (recognizing that obvious fantasy is not ac-
tionable as defamation). The jury verdict was reversed on appeal.  In Guccione v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987),
the court reversed a $1.6 million defamation judgment. See also Morsette v. Final Call,
764 N.Y.S.2d 416 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (reducing by more than one-half a $13 mil-
lion libel verdict against Nation of Islam newspaper).
126. Contemporaneously with the incipient appeal of the Telegraph Case, the Ohio
Court of Appeals overturned a $40 million judgment against Hustler magazine on the
grounds that the “enormous excessiveness of the verdict coupled with the repeated
appeals to passion and prejudice can lead to no other conclusion but that the verdict
of the jury was one influenced by passion and prejudice.”  Guccione v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., No. 80AP-375, 1981 WL 3516, at *40 (Ohio App. 1981).
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employer is not strictly liable for punitive damages based on the tor-
tious misconduct of employees.127  In order to recover punitive dam-
ages a plaintiff must prove culpability on the part of managerial
personnel or ratification of employee misconduct. There was no evi-
dence that any Telegraph editor ever saw the memorandum or knew
of its contents.128
Second, under the interpretation of the First Amendment guarantee
of freedom of the press adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., punitive damages are awardable only if
the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defama-
tory statements were made with actual malice or with reckless disre-
gard for their truth or falsity.129 There was no such evidence in the
Telegraph Case, other than that the reporters believed the contents of
the memorandum to be true.130
The compensatory damages portion of the award was likewise vul-
nerable to substantial reduction on appeal. Almost half of the $6.7
million in compensatory damages consisted of lost future profits from
uncompleted projects, based upon conjecture regarding their suc-
cess.131  Commercial real estate development involves an inherently
high level of market risk because of the infinite variety of things that
can and will go wrong, making estimates of future profitability highly
speculative.132  In addition, the Telegraph was prejudiced by another
of Judge Chapman’s questionable orders in limine, preventing defense
counsel from mentioning that Green had already obtained a $3 mil-
lion verdict in a lawsuit against Illini Federal in compensation for his
inability to obtain financing and loss of his properties—the same
losses Green claimed in the Telegraph Case.133
“I was very worried that the verdict might be overturned by the
Appellate Court,” Carr has acknowledged;  “I thought there was at
least a 50/50 chance of that occurring or a sizable reduction.”134  Al-
though Carr’s worries about the verdict surviving appellate review
were understandable, they turned out to be unnecessary. In order to
appeal a civil judgment, the Illinois court rules governing appellate
practice required a defendant to post a supersedeas bond equal to
127. Timothy R. Zinnecker, Corporate Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages,
1985 BYU L. REV. 317, 318 n.8 (1985). States that follow the “course of employment”
rule impose vicarious liability for punitive damages whenever the employee acts
within the scope of employment. Id.
128. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 13.
129. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
130. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 11.
131. Id. at 73.
132. See text accompanying supra note 122.
133. Brief of Appellants, supra note 54, at 116. See supra note 121 and accompany-
ing text.
134. E-mail from Rex Carr, supra note 88.
2014] THE CASE OF THE ALTON TELEGRAPH 603
150% of the damage award, including punitive damages.135  With a net
worth of only $3 million, the Telegraph lacked the resources to secure
a $13.8 million appeal bond. The Telegraph sought a relaxation of the
bond requirement, claiming that the enormity of the judgment made it
a practical impossibility to comply.136  Both the intermediate appellate
court and the Supreme Court of Illinois refused, citing the absence of
any flexibility under the rules or interpretative cases.137
In order to protect its assets from immediate seizure and preserve
its status as a going concern, the Telegraph was forced to file a Peti-
tion under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on April 10, 1981.138
The Cousleys erroneously believed that the bankruptcy filing would
shelter the Telegraph’s assets against execution by Green, while at the
same time enable the paper to appeal the award without having to
post a bond.139  The federal bankruptcy court held on January 22,
1982, that it had no jurisdiction to consider the merits of the Tele-
graph’s state court appeal.140  The Illinois Appellate Court held on
April 7, 1982, that the state courts no longer had jurisdiction over the
case once the Telegraph was involved in bankruptcy proceedings.141
Finding itself in a Catch-22 situation, the Telegraph agreed to settle
the case in June 1982 for $1.4 million, of which one million dollars
came from the paper’s insurer paying the policy limit.142  The Tele-
graph by then had paid more than $600,000 in attorneys’ fees.143
Once aggressive in its news coverage, the Telegraph turned cau-
tious, even passive, in the wake of the case.144  Editor Stephen Cous-
ley described the Telegraph as being like “a tight end who hears
135. Although many jurisdictions have since reformed their appeal bond process by
state statute or court interpretation, a supersedeas bond in the full amount of the
judgment, plus interest and costs, was typically required to stay execution of federal
and state court judgments at the time of the Telegraph Case. See infra notes 166–86.
136. Green v. Alton Telegraph Printing Co., 438 N.E.2d 203, 204 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982).
137. Id.
138. In re Alton Telegraph Printing Co., Inc., 16 B.R. 787 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1982)
(declining to interpret the federal bankruptcy statute as a broad jurisdictional grant of
authority by Congress to usurp state court appellate processes).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Green, 438 N.E.2d at 211.
142. Jonathan Friendly, Settlement Due in Alton Telegraph Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
15, 1982, at 12.
143. KANE, supra note 52, at 120.
144. “A chill descended on the Telegraph. Salaries were frozen. Newsroom vacan-
cies went unfilled. Cautious editors barred the use of anonymous sources; reporters
often destroyed notes after use lest they be subpoenaed in any future lawsuit.” FINK,
supra note 51. The Telegraph began subjecting reporters’ contacts with outside
sources to supervision by editors. Note, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 847, 858 (1985).
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footsteps.”145  Cousley has also remarked, “Wouldn’t you be gun-shy
if you nearly lost your livelihood and your house?”146
New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis, accepting Colby Col-
lege’s annual award in 1983 in memory of Elijah Lovejoy, described
the chilling effect of the Telegraph Case on the paper’s tradition for
investigative journalism:147  “Inside the paper, there are all kinds of
cautionary rules to ward off heavy libel damages in the future. . . .
When someone recently said there was misconduct in a sheriff’s office,
the editor decided against investigating the story. ‘Let someone else
stick their neck out this time,’ he said.”148
The Telegraph was sold to a newspaper chain controlled by Ralph
M. Ingersoll in 1985.149  Stephen Cousley resigned as editor in Sep-
tember 1986.150
V. AN APPEAL FOR APPEAL BOND REFORM
Entitlement to an appeal is thoroughly engrained in the popular im-
agination151 and is taken for granted by many law-trained people.152
However, the right to appeal is without basis in constitutional law.153
There is a persuasive argument for recognizing a constitutional right
to appeal as a fundamental element of procedural fairness.154  It is
based upon the structural need for a reliable appellate check on trial
court decision-making, not only in places like Madison County with its
reputation for having “magnet courts.”155
145. John Curley, How Libel Suit Sapped the Crusading Spirit of a Small Newspa-
per, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1983, at 1.
146. Salant, supra note 125.
147. Colby College gives the Elijah Parish Lovejoy Award to a journalist whose
work upholds the Lovejoy values place on free expression and investigative reporting.
See supra note 43.
148. Sam Zagoria, Time to Review Use of Libel Litigation, COURIER, Dec. 14, 1984,
at 4A.
149. Charles Storch, Ingersoll Buys Alton Telegraph, CHI. TRIB. (May 23, 1985),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1985-05-23/business/8502010803_1_libel-suit-new-
presses-cousley.
150. KILLENBERG, supra note 69, at 338.
151. Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1220
(2013).
152. The fact that criminal convictions are expunged when an appellant dies during
the appellate process demonstrates the value placed on appellate review in the crimi-
nal justice system. See, e.g., U.S. v. Crooker, 325 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1963).
153. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process of law has not been
held to include a constitutional right to an appeal. U.S. v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317,
323 (1976). The Supreme Court has declined petitions for certiorari seeking to per-
suade the Court to recognize a constitutional right to appeal in both civil and criminal
cases. Robertson, supra note 151, at 1221.
154. ABA Comm. on Standards of Judicial Admin., Standards Relating to Appel-
late Courts §3.10, at 18 (1994).
155. Inst. for Legal Reform, supra note 3.  Concern about judicial bias is not limited
to states like Illinois where elected judges are subject to political pressures. “Some-
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Trial and appellate court judges experience the trial drama from
very different perspectives. Unlike their appellate court counterparts,
trial judges personally confront the victims and villains of the drama in
their courtrooms, evaluating their demeanor and credibility, or per-
ceived lack thereof. Under the circumstances,156 it is foreseeable that
trial judges’ emotional impulses may influence their judgment.157
Misplaced confidence in the certainty of access to appellate review
has a liberating, but not necessarily beneficial, influence on trial court
behavior.158  Mindful of the availability of an appellate corrective, trial
judges may be tempted to access their inner-Solomon,159 be empow-
times the bias may be unconscious; judges are, after all, subject to the same cognitive
biases as everyone else.”  Robertson, supra note 151, at 1263.
156. “[J]udges, like everyone else, have two cognitive systems for making judg-
ments—the intuitive and the deliberative—and the intuitive system appears to have a
powerful impact on judges’ decision making.”  Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 43 (2007).
157. Judge Kevin Duffy presided over a bench trial of a lawsuit filed by magazine
publisher Penthouse against Dominion Federal Savings & Loan for breaching a com-
mitment to participate in a $97 million loan to finance a casino-hotel project in Atlan-
tic City. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 665 F. Supp. 301,
307–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Dominion’s share of the loan was twice the maximum
amount it could lend to a single borrower under the same federal banking regulation
that Piasa violated in its loans to Green. Id. When a sub-participant backed out of the
deal too late to find a replacement, Dominion desperately needed a way out of its
commitment without incurring liability. Id. at 303. Judge Duffy found that attorney
Phillip Gorelick was retained to serve “as Dominion’s hatchet man,” to “bully and
intimidate” Penthouse by making an endless series of unreasonable demands until the
commitment expired and Dominion was released from its obligation. Id. at 308. Judge
Duffy found incredible Gorelick’s testimony that he could not have acted in bad faith
for the purpose of destroying the deal because his client had never made him aware of
its dilemma. Id. at 306. Driven literally to the point of distraction by what he per-
ceived as Gorelick’s perjury, Judge Duffy held the members of Gorelick’s law firm
jointly and severally liable for damages by reason of their partner’s fraudulent con-
duct in the sum of $130 million, the lion’s share of which represented lost future prof-
its from a hypothetical Penthouse casino-hotel. Id. at 312. All of Judge Duffy’s factual
findings were categorically reversed on appeal as clearly erroneous, together with all
of his conclusions of law. Penthouse Int’l., Ltd. v. Dominion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005 (1989).
158. The availability of robust appellate remedies has “created a situation in which
the relationship between the trial and appeal are rightfully considered to exist in a
symbiotic relationship.”  Robertson, supra note 151, at 1256.
159. In Popov v. Hiyashi, Judge Kevin McCarthy might have awarded ownership of
Barry Bonds’ single-season homerun record baseball to Patrick Hyashi, in whose
hands (and then pocket) the loose ball came to rest in the right-field stands at San
Francisco’s PacBell Park on October 7, 2001. Popov v. Hiyashi, No. 400454, 2002 WL
31833731, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002). But first in time the ball had briefly
been in the webbing of a glove worn by Alex Popov, who tried to catch the ball in
flight only to lose it after being tackled, roughly jostled and kicked (and perhaps bit-
ten) in the ensuing scrum. Id. at *1–2. Judge McCarthy concluded that a zero-sum
decision awarding the ball to either party on these facts would be unfair to the other.
Id. at 8. He convened a session of court at the University of California, Hastings
College of Law to hear a panel of law professors participate in a forum on the law of
possession. Id. at *3. When the professors predictably disagreed, Judge McCarthy
found himself “left with something of a dilemma.” Id. at *7. He used his equitable
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ered to strike a blow for morality or intuitive fairness,160 lash out
against what they perceive as disrespect161 or social injustice,162 or
yield to such powerful forces of human nature as empathy, indigna-
tion, and outrage.163
discretion to craft a novel but personally satisfying remedy:  By ordering that the
baseball be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the claimants, Judge Mc-
Carthy secured a place in first-year Property casebooks for his opinion, and the sobri-
quet of Solomon-like for himself. Dean E. Murphy, Solomonic Decree in Dispute
Over Bonds Ball, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at A24. Whether the decision would
have survived appellate review will never be known. The ball sold at auction for only
$450,000. NICK TASLER, THE IMPULSE FACTOR 97 (2008). Popov’s share was insuffi-
cient to pay his legal fees, let alone finance an appeal. Attorney Martin Triano sued
his former client to collect $473,530 in unpaid legal fees. Id. Hyashi’s lawyer presuma-
bly had agreed to take the case on a contingency fee basis. Id.
160. Montgomery County, Maryland Circuit Court Judge James S. McAuliffe was
refreshingly candid in announcing his decision from the bench in a lawsuit filed by a
client of the Author seeking to enforce a two-page letter of intent for the purchase of
a $13 million shopping center. Order, Gorlitz v. Montgomery Village Assocs. II L.P.,
Civil No. 13856 (Cir. Ct. Md. May 23, 1986), at 6 (on file with author). Letters of
intent under the circumstances are routinely held by courts to be unenforceable for
lack of commercial certainty, as the trial judge acknowledged before granting declara-
tory judgment in favor of the purchaser. Id. Judge McAuliffe expressly noted the
strong probability of appeal as a consideration in deciding the case according to his
personal sense of justice. Id. “I think it not unlikely that there will be cross appeals
filed in this case . . . finding their way along Route 50 to this state’s capitol,” he opined
adding, “I am not so much concerned about the winning and the losing. . . .
[R]egardless of the winning and losing, I am going to sleep at night.” Id.
161. Judge Kathleen McHugh of the Broward County Circuit Court in Florida was
prepared to accept football player Chad “Ochocinco” Johnson’s plea bargain until he
gave a playful slap on the backside to his lawyer during a hearing. Roger Groves,
Questionable Ethics by the Judge that Jailed Chad Johnson, FORBES (June 11, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rogergroves/2013/06/11/questionable-ethics-by-the-judge-
that-jailed-chad-johnson/. Judge McHugh rejected the bargain and sentenced Johnson
to thirty days in jail, perhaps punishing him for spectators reacting with laughter in
her courtroom. Id.
162. For no apparent good reason, Miami-Dade County Circuit Court Judge Vale-
rie Schurr in the summer of 2009 granted a request by Joseph and Blanca Doyle for
continuance of Republic Federal Bank’s residential mortgage foreclosure of their
8,300 square foot home with an assessed value of $2.6 million. Republic Fed. Bank v.
Doyle, 19 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). “I was trying to make every-
body happy,” Judge Schurr explained in her opinion:
We have so many foreclosures here and I give continuances on these sales. I
just do. . . . [Y]ou know, people are having a hard time now. They are having
a difficult time. Everybody knows it. Businesses are failing. People are losing
money in the stock market. You know, employment is high. It’s just every-
body knows that we are in a bad time right now and I hate to see anybody
lose their home.
Id. The Florida Court of Appeal rebuked Judge Schurr for “abuse of discretion in the
most basic sense of that term.” Id. Although granting continuances generally is within
the trial judge’s discretion, “no judicial action of any kind can rest on such a founda-
tion.” Id. The sternly worded unanimous opinion quoted Justice Cardozo’s admoni-
tion that a judge “is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated
benevolence.” Id. at 1054–55 (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921)).
163. A Long Island couple was left debt-free as a result of a Suffolk County judge’s
indignation after hearing testimony by the regional manager for IndyMac Bank. See
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By providing a check on both the perception and the reality of bi-
ased, corrupt, or simply misguided trial court decision-making, access
to appellate review encourages confidence in the rule of law. Appel-
late decision-making is widely considered as enjoying the benefits of
deliberation, including the exchange of viewpoints and information,
inherent in the dynamics of the appellate process.164  If nothing else,
the appellate courts’ claim to superior judgment is based upon the
larger panel of deciders, on the theory that “three heads are better
than one.”165
The statistical probability of a successful appellate outcome demon-
strates the harshness of an inflexible appeal bond requirement, espe-
cially in the context of large-verdict defamation cases. The reversal
rate of state court cases on appeal is only 33%.166  But the rate in-
creases to 42% when a defendant appeals a judgment for plaintiff, and
to 48% when the amount of the judgment exceeds $1 million.167 The
rate of reversal or reduction of punitive damage awards in libel cases
is higher than 70%.168  Considering the likelihood of success on the
merits, the Telegraph’s inability to seek appellate review of a multi-
million dollar defamation award for want of a supersedeas bond was
highly prejudicial.
The appeal bond process in many states has been reformed since
1980, inspired by tobacco litigation tried in Madison County.169  A
lawsuit filed in 2000 by Sharon Price, on behalf of herself and a class
of smokers,170 alleged that Philip Morris, manufacturer of Marlboro
IndyMac Bank v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). The lender’s
intransigent refusal to restructure the couple’s sub-prime loan, or otherwise cooperate
in avoiding foreclosure was, according to Judge Jeffrey Spinner, not only “harsh, re-
pugnant, shocking and repulsive,” but also “inequitable, unconscionable, vexatious
and opprobrious.” Id. at 319. Noting that “Suffolk County is in the yawning abyss of a
deep mortgage and housing crisis with foreclosure filings at a record high rate,” Judge
Spinner sua sponte invoked his equitable jurisdiction to void the mortgage, erasing the
$290,000 principal balance and an additional $235,000 in accrued interest and penal-
ties. Id. at 317.
164. “The availability of appellate review . . . protect[s] against the possibility of
irreversible harm caused by a single judge’s biased or otherwise flawed decision mak-
ing.”  Robertson, supra note 151, at 1257.
165. Research has repeatedly shown that aggregating a number of individual judg-
ments provides a significantly more reliable result. Id. at 1264.
166. Id. at 1227.
167. Id.
168. Salant attributes the high rate of reversal in libel cases to sympathetic juries.
“When juries decide punishment in libel cases, their natural sympathies tend to lie
with the damaged plaintiff with whom they can identify far more easily than with the
powerful and sometimes arrogant news organizations.”  Salant, supra note 125.
169. Richard G. Stuhan & Sean P. Costello, The Appeal Bond—What It Is, How It
Works, and Why It Needs to be Factored into Your Litigation Strategy, http://www.
jonesday.com/files/Publication/983c1326-51c1-4ebc-9e6e-001ef4268418/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/daa0a1a0-c224-4cde-a744-64d80a235d12/Spring_2008_The_
Appeal_Bond.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
170. Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., No 00-L-112, 2003 WL 2259760, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 21, 2003).
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Lights and Cambridge Lights cigarettes, among other brands, had vio-
lated the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act by engaging in materially false
and deceptive representations in using the descriptor of “Lights” in
the branding of both cigarettes and the phrase “Lowered Tar and Nic-
otine” on both cigarette packaging labels.171  Following a bench trial
in Madison County Circuit Court in 2003, Philip Morris was ordered
to pay $7 billion in compensatory damages, $3 billion in punitive dam-
ages to the State of Illinois, plus attorneys’ fees.172
In order to stay execution under Rule 305 of the Illinois rules gov-
erning appellate practice,173 Philip Morris was required to post a $12
billion supersedeas bond to cover the entire judgment, interest, and
costs of appeal.174  The manufacturer claimed it could not post a bond
of that magnitude and make a $2.6 billion payment due under a na-
tional agreement that resolved lawsuits between cigarette makers and
several states.175  Accordingly, Madison County Circuit Court Judge
Nichols Byron reduced the size of the bond, allowing Philip Morris to
make cash payments of $800 million and to deliver a $6 billion inter-
est-bearing promissory note.176
The plaintiffs appealed the revised bond arrangement.177  The Ap-
pellate Court of Illinois held that Rule 305 was unambiguous178 and
that the trial court had no authority to deviate from its require-
ments.179  It remanded the case to the Madison County Circuit Court
to recalculate the amount of the appeal bond.180
171. Id. (citing 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2).
172. Id. at *29. The Illinois Supreme Court later reversed the judgment and or-
dered the case dismissed, holding that the Federal Trade Commission had permitted
tobacco companies to market cigarettes as “light” thereby preempting state consumer
fraud laws. Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2005), reh’g denied, 846
N.E.2d 597 (Ill. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1054 (2006).
173. ILCS S. CT. R. 305(a) Commentary (Revised Dec. 17, 1983).
174. Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 00-L-112, 2003 WL 2259760, at *29 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Mar. 21, 2003).
175. Barry Miller & Jonathan Fuerbringer, Philip Morris Appeal Bond Is Cut in
Half, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/15/business/15TOB
A.html?pagewanted=1&pagewanted=all.
176. Id. Elizabeth Warren, then a Harvard University law professor specializing in
bankruptcy and currently a U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, testified against the re-
duction of the amount of the bond and the substitution of a promissory note as being
too small and too risky to protect the judgment creditor. Brian Brueggemann, Philip
Morris Bond Is “a $6 billion IOU,” Expert Says, BELLEVILLE NEWS-DEMOCRAT (Apr.
25, 2003), archive.tobacco.org/news/124191.html. Madison County earned $17.6 mil-
lion in interest from the bond which was used to discharge virtually all county debt,
pay for administration and criminal courts buildings, establish an early retirement
program for county employees, and install a state-of-the-art 911 dispatch system.
Steve Whitworth, Supreme Court Turns Out the “Lights,” TELEGRAPH (Nov. 28,
2006), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-155113870.html.
177. Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 942, 946 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
178. Id. at 948.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 950.
2014] THE CASE OF THE ALTON TELEGRAPH 609
Philip Morris appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois.181  In the
exercise of its supervisory authority, the Supreme Court reinstated
Judge Byron’s modified appeal bond requirement for Philip Morris.182
In addition, exercising its rule-making authority governing appellate
practice, the Supreme Court amended Rule 305 “to give the courts
discretion in a money judgment case to approve a bond or other form
of security that covers less than the entire amount of the judgment
plus anticipated interest and costs.”183
Since Philip Morris, most states have amended their appeal bond
statutes to make the process less onerous for appellants.184  Five
northeastern states do not require a bond at all.185  Other states im-
pose caps on the amount that must be bonded,186 exclude the punitive
181. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Ill. Appellate Court, Fifth Dist., No. 96644, 2003 Ill.
LEXIS 2625 (Ill. Sept. 16, 2003).
182. Id. at *1.
183.  ILCS S. CT. RULE 305 (Commentary) (Revised Jan. 15, 2004).
184. “Appeal bond reform began in earnest in about 2000.”  Doug Rendleman, A
Cap on the Defendant’s Appeal Bond?: Punitive Damage Tort Reform, 39 AKRON L.
REV. 1089, 1091 (2006). For a summary of the appeal bond requirements in all 50
states, see Ariz. Chamber Found., Bonds. Appeal Bonds (Jan. 2011), available at
http://www.azchamber.com/assets/files/Press%20Releases/2011/Bonds.%20Appeal%
20Bonds.pdf (Exhibit #1).
185. They are Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Ver-
mont. Ariz. Chamber Found., supra note 184. In Maine, execution of judgments is
stayed pending appeal, but the court has discretion to order the judgment debtor to
post a bond in an amount determined by the court to compensate for the delay, loss of
interest and cost of appeal. ME. R. CIV. P. 62(c) (2013).  In Minnesota, trial courts
have discretion to waive an appeal bond, although the state supreme court has in-
structed that this discretion is to be exercised sparingly. MINN. R. APP. P. 108.02 (Ad-
visory Committee Comment, 2009 Amendments).
186. There are few states remaining, such as Alabama, Alaska, and Washington,
that require full-judgment appeal bonds. ALA. R. APP. P. 8(a)(1); ALASKA CT. R.
204(d); WASH. R. APP. P. 8.1. Many states have caps that are set at such high levels as
to be virtually meaningless. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-214 (2003) ($25 mil-
lion); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-16-125 (2003) ($25 million); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 45.045(1) (West 2013) ($50 million); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-6-46 (2004) ($25 million);
IND. CODE § 34-49-5-3(A), (B)(1)–(2) (2013) ($25 million); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 625A.9(2)(B) (West 2013) ($100 million); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.187(1) (West
2012) ($100 million); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §600.2607(1) (West 2013) ($25 mil-
lion); MO. REV. STAT. § 512.099(1) (2012) ($50 million); MISS. R. APP. P. 8(b)(2), (c)
(2013) ($100 million); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-289 (B) (West 2013) ($25 million);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-21-25 (1) (West 2011) ($25 million); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2505.09 (West 2014) ($50 million); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 990.4 (B)(1)(C)
(West 2013) ($25 million); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-133-11.1(A) (2012) ($50 million); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §15-26a-26 (2013) ($25 million); TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-1-124 (A),
(B) (West 2013) ($25 million); VA. CODE ANN. §8.01-676.1(J) (West 2013) ($25 mil-
lion); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-5-14(B), (D) (West 2013) ($50 million); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 808.07(2M)(a) (West 2013) ($100 million). In Kansas for judgments exceeding
$1 million, upon proof that requiring a bond in the full amount of the judgment will
result in “a denial of the right to an appeal,” the court may reduce the size of the bond
to $1 million plus 25% of the amount of the judgment in excess of $1 million. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-2103(d)(1) (2012). Arizona, Nebraska, and Texas have caps of 50%
of appellant’s net worth. ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 7(a)(2)(A)–(C) (2013); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 25-1916(1) (A)–(C) (2012); TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2013). Hawaii
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damages portion of the award entirely,187 or limit the amount of puni-
tive damages required to be bonded.188
Even if a statute or appellate court rule appears mandatory on its
face, some courts, both federal189 and state,190 have been receptive to
equitable arguments seeking an interpretation that allows for the ex-
ercise of discretion, with Judge Frank Easterbrook’s being the most
analytically satisfying:  By placing the assets of a bonding company
behind the obligation, an appeal bond assures that money to satisfy
the judgment will be available to appellee if the judgment is affirmed
on appeal.191  As a practical matter, a defendant who would be ren-
dered insolvent by a damages judgment will be unable to secure a
bond.192  Even if such a defendant could obtain a bond, the result
would be a windfall to the judgment creditor, who would then be
placed in a preferred position over unsecured creditors of the judg-
ment debtor.193 What a judgment creditor can reasonably expect
under such circumstances is that its position will be protected against
and Wyoming have caps for small business appellants based upon number of employ-
ees. HAW. REV. STAT. § 607-26(A)(1) (2013) ($1 million); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-17-
201(A) (West 2013) ($2 million).
187. ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 7(a)(2)(A)–(C) (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-1-124
(B) (West 2013); TEX. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1) (2013); UTAH R. CIV. P. 62(j)(2)(C) (2013).
188. IDAHO APP. R. 13(b)(15) (2013) ($1 million); MISS. R. APP. P. 8(b)(2)(c)
(2013) ($100 million).
189. A supersedeas bond in the full amount of the judgment, plus interest and
costs, is required to stay execution of a federal court judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d).
Notwithstanding its literal language, some federal court judges have interpreted Rule
62(d) as providing room for flexibility. For example, Judges Richard Posner and Frank
Easterbrook have taken the position that a federal court may limit the required
amount of the appeal bond to compensatory damages, and substitute alternative
forms of security, such as forbidding the payment of dividends or other cash distribu-
tions by the judgment debtor during the pendency of an appeal. Olympia Equip.
Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Texaco,
Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1152–55 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding reduction of
$12 billion bond requirement to $1 million), rev’d on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987);
N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 281 (7th Cir. 1986)
(court has discretion to require appellant to provide periodic reports to facilitate
monitoring in lieu of bond).
190. See, e.g., Polar Equip., Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., No. 3AN-87-3826 CI (Alaska
Sup. Ct. Apr. 23, 1992) (refusing to order bonding of punitive damages portion of
award so long as appellant maintained a net worth equal to ten times the unbonded
amount of the judgment); Midkiff v. de Bisschop, 574 P.2d 128, 131 (Haw. 1978)
(amount of bond discretionary with trial court); Scott River Sand & Rock Co. v.
Dunevant, 213 P.3d 251, 253 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (court has discretion to reduce
bond or substitute alternate security); Shanghai Inv. Co v. Alteka Co., 993 P.2d 516,
538 (Haw. 2000) (court has discretion to allow alternative forms of security in lieu of
appeal bond).
191. See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co., 786 F.2d at 800 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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erosion during its period of jeopardy (i.e., while the right to enforce its
judgment is stayed pending completion of appellate review).194
If and when there is a constitutional right to an appeal, the constitu-
tionality of non-discretionary appeal bond rules and statutes will be
subject to challenge in situations like the Telegraph Case, where post-
ing a bond in the full amount of the judgment would force the judg-
ment debtor into bankruptcy.195
Whether or not a constitutional right to appeal is ever recognized
generally, for media defendants the right to appellate review is an es-
sential buttress of explicit constitutional guarantees protected by the
First Amendment.196  Freedom of the press has long been held to oc-
cupy a preferred position among the constitutional values197 in light of
journalists’ role in keeping people informed as citizens.198  Supreme
Court decisions recognize that access to independent appellate review
ensures that protected expression will not be inhibited by protecting
media defendants against the existential threat of potentially crippling
damage awards.199  Without the certainty of access to appellate re-
194. The median time from filing notice of appeal to final disposition in a civil ap-
peal in the federal court system was 12.2 months in the twelve-month period ending
September 30, 2012. Judicial Business 2012, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/appendices/B04ASep12.pdf (Table B-4A)
(last visited Dec. 27, 2013). Note: For the twelve-month period ending on March 31,
2013, the median time was 11.8 months, based upon unpublished data on file with the
Author.
195. One commentator already believes that requiring an appellant to post a super-
sedeas bond without judicial discretion to provide for alternative forms of security
“denies an appellant’s due process right to an effective appeal.”  Elaine A. Carlson,
Mandatory Supersedeas Bond Requirements – A Denial of Due Process Rights?, 3
BAYLOR L. REV. 29, 39 (1987).
196. “[F]irst amendment rights are fragile and can be destroyed by insensitive pro-
cedures. . . . [C]ourts must thoroughly evaluate every aspect of the procedural system
which protects these rights.”  Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,”
83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 551 (1970).
197. “[T]he First Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dis-
semination of information . . . is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press
is a condition of a free society.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 398 (1974)
(White, J., dissenting).
198. KILLENBERG, supra note 69, at xv. (“Journalists play an indispensable role as
surrogates for citizens too busy, too tired, too infirm or too unqualified to govern for
themselves. Reporters act on the public’s behalf when they scrutinize candidates for
elected office; request judicial records at the courthouse; investigate the expenditure
of municipal tax dollars; attend meetings of the school board; interview prisoners held
in the county jail; or stand watch over a limitless range of issues and conditions that
touch the lives of citizens. As they serve the public, journalists expose corruption,
sound alarms, question public policy, demand accountability and expose injustice.”).
199. The Supreme Court has recognized the uniqueness of libel suits in establishing
a heightened standard of review for malice in order “to ensure that protected expres-
sion will not be inhibited.”  Appellate judges “must exercise independent judgment
and determine whether the record establishes actual malice with convincing clarity.”
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505, 514 (1984). The
Court has also required that appellate courts engage in de novo review of punitive
damages awards. Robertson, supra note 151, at 1252–54.
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view, the prospect of staggering libel judgments can chill the exercise
of First Amendment rights, as the Court in Gertz predicted,200 espe-
cially by small publications that are a principal source of minority and
unpopular points of view.201
Newsgathering organizations that seek to raise First Amendment
defenses in appealing a punitive damages judgment are constitution-
ally entitled to independent appellate review, even if they cannot af-
ford a supersedeas bond for the full amount of the judgment.202  In
such cases, a judgment creditor is entitled to protection against the
possibility that appellant’s financial condition may take a turn for the
worse during the appellate process, and it is also protected against the
specter of appellant dissipating assets or placing assets beyond the
reach of execution.203
The legitimate interests of both parties may be accommodated by
alternative forms of security in lieu of a supersedeas bond.204  As a
condition of appeal, the trial court may require the judgment debtor
to (a) take all steps necessary to maintain the value of its assets (e.g.,
carry adequate insurance); (b) not make payments to third parties ex-
cept debts to trade creditors in the ordinary course of business; (c)
freeze salaries; (d) suspend bonuses, dividends, and other cash distri-
butions; (e) refrain from incurring further indebtedness or pledging
existing assets as collateral for antecedent indebtedness; or (f) afford
inspection and audit rights to the judgment creditor.205  Additional
conditions may be imposed depending upon the particular circum-
200. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 770 (White, J., concurring) (“If the press could be faced with possibly sizable
damages for every mistaken publication injurious to reputation, the result would be
an unacceptable degree of self-censorship, which might prevent the occasional mis-
taken libel, but would also often prevent the timely flow of information that is
thought to be true but cannot be readily verified.”).
201. Punitive Damages and Libel Law, supra note 144.
202. Cf. Adsani v. Miller, 139 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1998) (Because there is no right to
appeal the judgment in a copyright infringement case under the due process or equal
protection clause, a non-resident judgment debtor with no assets in the U.S. may be
required to post a supersedeas bond without violating constitutional protections.).
203. See generally Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794,
800 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
204. See Timothy S. Bishop & Jeffrey W. Sarles, Supersedeas Bonds: A Crushing
Burden (June 15, 2013), http://www.appellate.net/articles/supersedeas.asp; David Ax-
elrod & Peter Batalden, Staying Enforcement of a Money Judgment Pending Appeal
(Aug. 2008), http://www.horvitzlevy.com/images/ps_attachment/attachment95.pdf;
Lori Ploeger, Federal Stays and Supersedeas Bonds, http://www.cooley.com/files/tbl_
s5SiteRepository/FileUpload21/304/A-Ploeger-Federal%20Stays%20and%20Super-
sedeas%20Bonds.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2013).
205. The alternative security package is similar to the typical financial covenants for
the protection of creditors included in commercial loan agreements designed to assure
that debtors will maintain their financial status and refrain from conduct that would
adversely affect their condition. The constant tension between lenders and borrowers
closely resembles that between judgment creditors and debtors. See Robert M. Lloyd,
Financial Covenants in Commercial Loan Documentation: Uses and Limitations, 58
TENN. L. REV. 335, 342–43, 346 (1991).
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stances.206  Accelerated oral argument should be made available in
such cases to reduce the period of time during which appellee is at
risk.207
Since colonial times, the supersedeas bond has been understood as
a means of ensuring that, if affirmed on appeal, the judgment will be
satisfied. It is time to re-imagine the concept of an appeal bond in a
more fundamental way than occurred during the first generation of
reforms inspired by Philip Morris. For media defendants at least, the
appeal bond should properly be understood as a device to preserve
the status quo and protect the constitutional right to appeal.208
VI. CONCLUSION
Located near the confluence of three major rivers, the city of Alton
became the place where the exercise of freedom of the press and the
right to appeal intersected in the historic case of the Alton Telegraph.
The paper that helps perpetuate the memory of Elijah Lovejoy, the
first martyr in the cause of a free press, was forced to file for bank-
ruptcy after losing a record judgment in a libel suit. The irony is that
the suit was based upon a story that never appeared in the paper. The
206. For example, in Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox, appellee complained
that appellant was causing further harm to appellee by continuing to post defamatory
comments on appellant’s websites. Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 812 F. Supp. 1220
(D. Or. 2011). Under such circumstances, it would be appropriate to condition relaxa-
tion of the appeal bond requirement upon appellant suspending further comment
about appellee pending the outcome of the appellate process. This and certain other
elements of an alternative security package may constitute an abridgment of speech.
That certain burdens on the press result in incidental abridgment of speech does not
render them impermissible. If partial or incidental abridgement of speech is justified
by valid governmental interests, constitutional rights have not been denied. Am.
Commc’n Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950).
207. Accelerated oral argument was part of the package of alternative security
crafted by the Seventh Circuit in Olympia Equip. Leasing Co., 786 F.2d at 799.
208. Illinois now has an appeal bond statute that strikes the balance recommended
in this Article. In its present form, Rule 305(a) of the Rules Governing Appellate
Practice provides that an appeal bond ordinarily shall be in an amount sufficient to
cover the judgment, costs and interest reasonably anticipated to accrue during the
pendency of an appeal. ILCS S. CT. R. 305(a) (2013).  However, the rule goes on to
provide as follows:
If the court, after weighing all the relevant circumstances, including the
amount of the judgment, anticipated interest and costs, the availability and
cost of a bond or other form of security, the assets of the judgment debtor. . .
and any other factors the court may deem relevant, determines that a bond
or other form of security in the amount of the judgment plus anticipated
interest and costs is not reasonably available to the judgment debtor, the
court may approve a bond or other form of security in the maximum amount
reasonably available to the judgment debtor. In the event that the court ap-
proves a bond or other form of security in an amount less than the amount
of the judgment plus anticipated interest and costs, the court shall impose
additional conditions on the judgment debtor to prevent dissipation or diver-
sion of the judgment debtor’s assets during the appeal.
Id.
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tragedy is that the jury verdict was never subject to appellate review
because the Telegraph lacked the resources to post a bond of the mag-
nitude required to stay enforcement of the judgment pending appeal.
Thirty-five years after the Telegraph Case, the inability to seek ap-
pellate review of a crippling damages award in a libel suit still presents
an existential threat to all but the largest media organizations. By its
chilling effect on newsgathering and its adverse impact on the people’s
right to know, the appeal bond requirement abridges First Amend-
ment freedoms. A re-imagination of the supersedeas bond require-
ment, at least as it applies to media defendants seeking to raise First
Amendment protections, will reconcile their constitutional right to ap-
peal and the legitimate interests of their judgment creditors.
